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COMMENTS 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA: 
THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE DISPUTE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1925, Argentina and Great Britain have been engaged in 
a significant diplomatic dispute over sovereign rights on the Antarc-
tic continent. 1 During the last fifteen years, the provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty2 have resulted in a relaxation of tensions between 
the two countries, but the truce is an uneasy one. Most legal writers 
on the subject of sovereignty in Antarctica have generally regarded 
Argentina's claim to disputed Antarctic territory as distinctly infer-
ior to that of Great Britain.3 Yet a thorough examination of sover-
eignty in the Antarctic context indicates that resolution of the con-
flict between the two nations will be a close question. 
The dispute between Argentina and Great Britain has its origin 
in a confusing web of conflicting theories concerning the acquisition 
of territorial sovereignty. Twentieth century discussions by eminent 
legal writers are replete with abundant references to such terms as 
occupatio, terra nullius, animus occupandi, corpus possessionis, 
effective occupation, annexation, sectors, contiguity, continuity, 
peaceful and continuous display of authority, and discovery. From 
the midst of these theories arises the present legal confusion over the 
various national claims to the Antarctic continent.4 It is no surprise 
that there has been very little agreement among the claimant states 
and their proponents over the ultimate disposition of Antarctic 
claims. 
The various theories of territorial sovereignty do not exist solely 
in an academic vacuum, however. The issue of territorial sover-
1. Memorial of the United Kingdom, Antarctica Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 8, 26 (1955) 
[hereinafter cited as Memorial of the United Kingdom]. 
2. Antarctic Treaty, done December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 
U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961). Several countries have made claims to various portions 
of the Antarctic continent. The Antarctic Treaty operates to place these claims in a sus-
pended state. Those nations with sovereign designs upon the continent have not waived their 
claims by becoming parties to the Treaty; however, the Treaty prohibits expansion of those 
claims or the assertion of new ones. This article will focus upon the British and Argentine 
claims to a particular section of the Antarctic continent. Claims advanced by other nations 
to the remainder of Antarctica are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
3. See, for example, notes 9, 18, 32, & 40 infra and accompanying text. 
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eignty has been addressed in three significant cases which are par-
ticularly applicable to the Antarctic problem. The Island of Palmas 
Case5 concerned a dispute between the Netherlands and the United 
States over sovereign rights to a small island in the South Pacific. 
The Clipperton Island Case6 resulted in a determination that France 
and not Mexico retained sovereignty over an uninhabited guano 
island off the Mexican coast. Finally, despite Norway's assertions 
to the contrary, the Permanent Court of International Justice held 
Denmark to be the rightful sovereign over all of Greenland in the 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland. 7 
The purpose of this article is to examine the relevant arguments 
of Argentina and Great Britain and, in light of an analysis of the 
theories of territorial sovereignty and prior decisions, to suggest 
that, should the dispute be referred for decision to the International 
Court of Justice, Argentina has a formidable array of arguments at 
her disposal. It may be argued that the opportunity for decision by 
.. 
the Court is foreclosed by the existence of the Antarctic Treaty, that 
the issue of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica is moot. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the possibility of a Court determination is a 
substantial one for three significant reasons. 
First, in reference to the dispute between Argentina and Brit-
ain, there is already historical precedent for judicial action: in 1955, 
Great Britain formally filed an application and invited Chile and 
Argentina to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in order to 
obtain a determination of the issue. Chile and Argentina declined, 
and the cases were dismissed from the Court's list.8 Second, an 
examination of articles XII(l)(a), XII(2)(a), and XII(2)(c) of the 
Antarctic Treaty indicates the relative ease with which a contract-
ing party can extricate itself from the treaty provisions.9 Assuming 
for the moment that Argentina has a reasonable opportunity to 
prevail if the dispute is brought before the Court, there is a distinct 
possibility that Argentina would not only avail herself of the treaty 
termination provisions but would initiate Court action herself, in 
5. (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
6. (Mexico v. France), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1105 (1931), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). 
7. [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53. 
8. Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina), [1956] I.C.J. 12; (United Kingdom 
v. Chile), id. at 15. Chile has also advanced a claim to part of the territory involved in the 
Anglo-Argentine dispute . The two Latin American nations, however, have informally agreed 
to resolve their dispute subsequent to an invalidation of Britain's claim. 
9. Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 311 (1975). 
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effect turning the diplomatic tables on Great Britain. Third, the 
prospects of technological advance and improved accessibility to 
mineral resources in the Antarctic may prove too great a strain 
for the treaty to withstand.1° Should the Antarctic Treaty be re-
nounced, even by relatively few of the contracting parties, the sub-
sequent scramble for mineral wealth would serve to resurrect the 
tangled complexities of territorial claims. The Eastern Greenland 
Case is proof positive that "such a question can be handled judi-
cially." 11 
II. THEORIES OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The germinal concept in any discussion of territorial sover-
eignty is that of peaceful and continuous display of state authority, 
for it is from this concept that the overwhelming number of variant 
theories springs. Peaceful and continuous display of authority, sim-
ply stated, is the requirement that a state demonstrate that it has 
acquired valid title over given territory and has continued to exert 
its authority through "the actual display of state activities. " 12 The 
Permanent Court of International Justice has determined that the 
concept of peaceful and continuous display of authority consists of 
two distinct elements: (1) the intention and will to act as sovereign, 
and (2) some actual display of authority .13 
The first element is readily cognizable; a state need only assert 
its sovereign rights to given territory by way of decree in order to 
comply with the requirement. The second element, however, is less 
easily applied. The claimant state must display, by means of some 
outwardly demonstrable exercise, the authority which lends support 
to its initial desire to incorporate the territory. The Court has em-
phasized that this display of authority is insufficient if exerted only 
at the time title is first created. The claimant state is required to 
continue its display of authority, since the state's effective occupa-
tion of the territory "would be inconceivable, if effectiveness were 
required only for the act of acquisition and not equally for the main-
tenance of the right." 14 The Court has indicated thatthe concept of 
peaceful and continuous display of authority is the cornerstone of 
10. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 217, 223 (1974). 
11. Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 119 (1947). 
12. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 875. 
13. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933) P.C.I.J ., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46. 
14. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 876. 
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territorial sovereignty; it is the "sound and natural criterium" in 
deciding whether title to given territory is valid as against any 
other state. 15 
A. Discovery 
A relative minority of authority has promulgated the theory 
that discovery alone, without any further action by the claimant 
state, is sufficient to acquire title to territory. Great Britain has 
advanced this theory in order to buttress her claim to certain areas 
within the Antarctic region.16 Prior to the sixteenth century, discov-
ery per se was deemed sufficient to acquire sovereign rights, and it 
has been stated that those states "which are so unfortunate as to 
be without any coastline facing the Antarctic" and, therefore, un-
able to avail themselves of the sector theory, discussed below, 17 have 
been forced to resurrect the ancient discovery theory in order to 
protect their claims. 18 
The discovery theory, however, has been repudiated by the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration. Discovery, "without any subsequent 
act," is insufficient to prove sovereignty over the territory claimed. 19 
The court, however, has not entirely denied the utility of discovery 
in acquiring territorial sovereignty. Rather, discovery alone has 
been held to be a potential tool for obtaining inchoate title, and this 
title can be perfected, within a reasonable time, by an effective 
occupation of the territory claimed. The court has specified that an 
inchoate title, acquired by means of discovery, cannot prevail over 
the peaceful and continuous display of authority exercised by a rival 
state. 20 
The rationale behind the rejection of the discovery theory is 
readily apparent upon review of the existing situation in the Antarc-
tic. The overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain 
demonstrate the confusion over factual bases for establishment of 
territorial sovereignty. The Court would be confronted with myriad 
15. Id. at 840, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 877. 
16. Comment, International Law-Claims to Sovereignty-Antarctica, 28 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 386, 392 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Claims]. 
17. See text accompanying notes 33-45 infra. 
18. Note, The Validity of Claims of Sovereignty over Antarctic Lands, 5 INTRA. L. REV. 
112, 120 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Validity of Claims] . 
19. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 846, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 884. 
20. Id. at 846, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 884; see 0. SvARLIEN, THE EASTERN GREENLAND CASE 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 55 (1964). 
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assertions of discovery by a variety of explorers and little hope of 
eventually sorting out the actual facts. Moreover, the states which 
base their claims of sovereignty on discovery alone belie their own 
acceptance of the theory: they continue their attempts to shore up 
sovereign claims by resorting to a "back door" use of effective occu-
pation. 21 It is therefore clear that discovery per se is not a viable, 
valid method of acquiring territorial sovereignty. 
B. Occupation 
The doctrine of effective occupation as a basis for territorial 
sovereignty is the prevalent theory espoused by modern authority. 
According to Moore's classic definition, "[ t]itle by occupation is 
gained by the discovery, use, and settlement of territory not occu-
pied by a civilized power. " 22 The doctrine has its beginnings in the 
Roman law of property which embodied the notion that the owner's 
control over the res was an essential element. The logical underpin-
ning of the doctrine was that only the exercise of sufficient control 
over the property would ensure efficient use of it by those "best in 
a position" to do so. 23 In applying the occupation doctrine to the 
acquisition of territory, the state assumes the role of owner and is 
therefore subject to several requirements in order to maintain clear 
and effective title. First, regardless of a private citizen's relation to 
his state, such citizen's discovery and occupation of territory is not 
sufficient to establish sovereign rights unless that state promptly 
endorses the citizen's actions. 24 Second, in order to meet the Court's 
requirement of peaceful and continuous display of authority, the 
state must ensure that its inchoate title is not invalidated by the 
subsequent activities of a rival state. Occupation is the positive 
method to protect against such an eventuality .25 
During the early years of application of the occupation doc-
trine, in strict accordance with Moore's definition, settlement was 
viewed as the only method by which to meet the requirements of 
effective occupation. In light of such an interpretation, exercise of 
sovereignty over desolate, uninhabited regions was deemed impossi-
ble since the inability to settle such areas precluded satisfaction of 
21. Claims, supra note 16, at 392. 
22. 1 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 258 (1906). 
23. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 319. 
24. Id. at 320-21. 
25. Id. at 321-22. 
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an element of effective occupation.26 The modern approach has been 
to temper such a rigid requirement in view of two significant practi-
cal considerations. First, various states, hampered by the stricter 
view, simply ignored it; 27 second, with the advent of state interest 
in desolate areas, specifically the polar regions, the need to relax the 
settlement requirement became particularly apparent. 28 The effect 
of relaxation of the standard, however, was to create a basic uncer-
tainty: in the absence of permanent settlement, what did effective 
occupation mean? 
According to Bernhardt, "[e]ffectiveness should be viewed as 
the objective manifestation of a continuous development of control 
commencing with discovery and subsequent inchoate title and con-
tinuing by permanent settlement and administration."29 This defi-
nition of effectiveness, however, contains the requirement of perma-
nent settlement and would seem to preclude the possibility of effec-
tive occupation in Antarctica. The author continues: 
To maintain that actual continuous possession is required in a 
largely uninhabited land is to misconstrue the real nature of 
occupatio. Effective possession requires only that degree of control 
which is necessary under the totality of the circumstances prevalent 
in the area to make the presence of authority of the occupying state 
felt by and against all others . It is therefore a flexible and compara-
tive standard .... 30 
The permanent settlement requirement has disappeared, but we are 
left with a rather indefinite and ambiguous standard as a replace-
ment. 
Other authorities have also attempted to come to grips with the 
meaning of effectve occupation under the less strict view. Von der 
Heydte has promulgated the principle of virtual effectiveness, but 
has fallen short of concretizing the meaning of the term: 
The consciousness of an existing power which is capable of being 
exerted everywhere must penetrate the whole country, even if in fact 
such power, radiating from some points of support, becomes mani-
fest only in relatively few acts displaying such sovereignty. In a 
26. See Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations, 4 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 265, 267 (1910). 
27. Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in Inter-
national fow, 29 AM. J . INT'L L. 448, 462 (1935). 
28. P . JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 141. 
29. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 322. 
30. Id. at 323. 
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given case on the one hand, the possibility, and on the other the fear, 
of a p1.mitive expedition corresponds even more to the intrinsic sense 
of effectiveness than a police station in every [district].31 
125 
The indefiniteness of effective occupation continues to exist, despite 
the valiant efforts of legal writers to place the definition within 
practical, concrete parameters.32 
C. Sectors 
The sector theory, devised by Canada, was first applied to the 
Arctic.33 Under the sector theory, a state with territory which bor-
ders the Arctic and which extends within the Arctic Circle 
may claim all of the area between a base line connecting the meridi-
ans of longitude marking the limits of its easterly and westerly fron-
tiers, and extending as far north as the final intersection of those 
meridians at the North Pole.34 
This division of the polar icecap into "pie slices" has been applied 
by several claimant states to the Antarctic. Since no state's territory 
extends within the Antarctic Circle, however, a variation of the 
Arctic model has been devised. The proponents of the sector theory 
in Antarctica base the longitudinal borders of their territorial claims 
on the extent of their discovery and exploration of the region; the 
outer limit of the "pie slice" is formed by the 60th parallel.35 
The characteristics of polar sectors have no relation to the prin-
ciple of peaceful and continuous display of authority. The sector 
theory is unconcerned with the presence or absence of state control, 
no matter how ill-defined; rather, the theory posits a unique rela-
tionship between the claimant state and the particular territory in 
question. 36 Since the sector theory presumably departs from the 
peaceful and continuous display requirement, some authorities have 
gone to great lengths to distinguish between the Arctic and Antarc-
tic models. Bernhardt offers four significant distinctions: (1) Ant-
arctica possesses a geological land base while the Arctic is formed 
solely of ice, (2) unlike the claimant states in the Arctic model, no 
state's continental land mass projects within the Antarctic circle, 
31. Von der Heydte, supra note 27, at 465. 
32. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 113. See, e.g., Hyde, Acquisition of Sovereignty 
over Polar Areas, 19 low AL. REV. 286, 288 (1934). 
33. G. SMEDAL, ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 54 (1931). 
34. Hyde, supra note 32, at 289. 
35. Id. at 291-92; Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 117-18. 
36. Hyde, supra note 32, at 289. 
7
MacKechnie: Sovereignty in Antarctica
Published by SURFACE, 1977
126 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 5:119 
(3) unlike its northern counterpart, the Antarctic region is likely 
to become a center of increasing activity, and (4) the Antarctic sec-
tors themselves, as presently delimited, are "contradictory and 
impractical. " 37 Hyde's distinction between the two models rests 
upon the application of the theories of continuity and contiguity, 
discussed below. Since these theories have some application in the 
Arctic, they provide a foundation for the sector theory as utilized 
there. These two theories, however, are presumed to have no appli-
cation in the Antarctic, and the sector theory therefore loses its 
foundation. 38 Hayton's difficulty with the Antarctic model is 
based upon the use of the 60th parallel as the outer limit of the ter-
ritorial claim: 
Sectors . . . should properly begin with their base on the mainland 
and project toward the offshore territories. As it is, the Antarctic 
sectors are based on an arbitrary Parallel on the high seas and 
project toward an alien mainland.39 
Waldock, a proponent of the British sector theory, asserts that the 
distinctions between Arctic and Antarctic sector models are exag-
gerated. He contends that Antarctic sectors are not arbitarily delim-
ited but are "framed as geographical extensions of land claimed, 
whether rightly or wrongly, to be already under the sovereignty of 
the· sector states. " 40 
By far the greatest objection to the sector theory is that it has 
no foundation in or application to traditional precepts of interna-
tional law. The theory has been variously described as "a watered-
down concept of acquisition,"41 "legally irrelevant,"42 "contrary to 
every legal system and entirely unwarranted, " 43 and as not having 
"achieved the status of a legal principle in international law." 44 
There are those, however, who assert that the Antarctic situation, 
because of its unique problems, .has given the sector theory a cloak 
of legal respectability: "the sector principle as applied at least to 
Antarctica is now a part of the accepted international legal order. " 45 
37. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 336-37. 
38. Hyde, supra note 32, at 291. 
39. Hayton, The "American" Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 603 (1956). 
40. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 311, 340 (1948). 
41. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 338. 
42. Hayton, supra note 39, at 606. 
43. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 121-22. 
44. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 338. 
45. Reeves, Antarctic Sectors, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1939); see, e.g. , Waldock, 
supra note 40, at 341. Contra, Elder, Decision on Polar Sovereignty by Student Moot Court, 
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 656, 656-57 (1947). 
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D. Contiguity, Continuity-Hinterland, Uti Possidetis 
1. CONTIGUITY 
127 
The contiguity doctrine has been advocated at times by states 
attempting to lay claim to islands located off their coastlines but 
outside the limits of their territorial waters. The fact that an island 
is located within relative proximity to the claimant state is pur-
ported to be a "geographical connexion" between the two land mas-
ses and, therefore, a foundation for the exercise of territorial sover-
eignty.46 It should be noted that the traditional view of the concept 
is that it encompasses only the acquisition of islands, not continen-
tal land masses. The modern justification for the concept is that the 
state relies upon the island claimed as a source of sustenance. 47 
The contiguity theory, as applied to the Antarctic, has been 
vigorously attacked on the grounds that it flies in the face of effec-
tive occupation requirements. Antarctica, it is argued, is a continent 
in and of itself with no "geographical connexion" to any other conti-
nent. "No State can claim that it is 'adjacent' or 'contiguous,' or 
that it controls the coastline at any point. " 48 Chile and Argentina, 
on the other hand, maintain that the highlands of the Antarctic 
continent are merely extensions of the Andes range, part of which 
is submerged between the South American and Antarctic land mas-
ses. The two Latin American countries support their claim by refer-
ence to geological data. 49 This argument, while forceful, ignores the 
traditional emphasis placed on the continent-island relationship of 
the contiguity doctrine. Von der Heydte, however, dismisses the 
strict traditional interpretation. He argues that the contiguity doc-
trine, properly applied, has its roots in the principle of virtual effec-
tiveness, and there is, therefore, no justification or logic in restrict-
ing its application solely to islands located off a claimant state's 
coast.50 Von der Heydte's analysis reaches a position diametrically 
opposed by the authorities previously mentioned: "[b]esides effec-
tive occupation, geographic contiguity is recognized to be a full and 
sufficient sovereign title."51 
46. Waldock, supra note 40, at 341. 
47. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 341. 
48. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 117; Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 341. 
49. Claims, supra note 16, at 395. 
50. Von der Heydte, supra note 27, at 470-71. 
51. Id. at 463. 
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2. CONTINUITY-HINTERLAND 
The continuity-hinterland theories are close relatives of the 
contiguity doctrine. They are discussed here together because they 
embody, generally speaking, the same principle. The theories hold 
that a state which occupies or controls a coastal area may extend 
its claim inland "up to either the middle line of the continent, the 
outer reach of the water shed or some other obvious natural bound-
ary."52 
The continuity-hinterland theories are sometimes used in sup-
port of the sector principle, as applied in the Antarctic. The east-
west boundaries of the claimant state, formed by the extent of dis-
covery and exploration along the Antarctic coastline, are projected 
· inland to the South Pole completing formation of the "pie slice. " 53 
The argument is made, however, that effective control is a necessary 
prerequisite to a valid claim of sovereignty, and on this basis the 
continuity-hinterland theories, though in vogue during the nine-
teenth century, were never recognized as valid. 54 
3. UTI PossmETis 
The uti possidetis doctrine is advanced exclusively by the Latin 
American nations which claim sovereign rights in the Antarctic. 
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that Argentina and Chile, when 
they ceased to be colonies of Spain, succeeded to Spanish rights of 
sovereignty as granted by the Papal Bull, Inter Caetera. 55. Under the 
uti possidetis doctrine, therefore, no territory in the Western Hemi-
sphere is considered res nullius, and all holdings of the former Span-
ish empire are transferred, by way of succession, to the Latin Ameri-
can nations as the "legitimate heirs" of Spain.56 
The Argentine-Chilean invocation of uti possidetis as the foun-
dation of their claims to territory in the Antarctic is generally ac-
knowledged to be of little utility. The validity of the Papal Bull 
itself is seriously questioned, 57 and, assuming for the moment that 
the Bull is valid, Argentina and Chile have inherited, at best, an 
inchoate title to the territory claimed. The two countries would 
simply assume the position of Spain in regard to the inchoate titles 
52. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 114; Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 342-43. 
53. Hayton, supra note 39, at 605. 
54. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 345. 
55. See van der Heydte, supra note 27, at 451-52. 
56. Claims, supra note 16, at 394. 
57. Hayton, supra note 39, at 598 n.69a. 
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and would still be required to follow the general precepts of terri-
torial acquisition: discovery followed by effective occupation. De-
crees are not sufficient; the successor claimant state must prove the 
perfection and maintenance of its title. 58 The doctrine of uti 
possidetis "has proved to be so indefinite and ambiguous that it has 
become somewhat discredited,"59 and one authority has gone so far 
as to assert that invocation of the doctrine would receive short shrift 
by disinterested judges or arbiters. 60 
III. SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE THE COURT: THE CASES 
As has been previously stated, the foregoing theories of acquisi-
tion of territorial sovereignty do not exist in a vacuum. The issue of 
sovereignty has been squarely addressed in three significant cases. 
One commentator has advanced the argument that the three cases 
discussed below would be of little assistance in clarifying the situa-
tion as it exists in the Antarctic. The argument is that, if the Court 
were asked for an advisory opinion or judgment on sovereignty in 
Antarctica, there would be nothing in the way of precedent upon 
which the Court could base its decision: 
This would mean that the Court must decide a completely new 
question of law with no rules or precedents to serve as guides. The 
Eastern Greenland, Palmas Island, Clipperton Island and other 
cases are sufficiently different on their facts to be inapplicable. In 
nearly all, there was a long history of exploration and assertion of 
sovereignty extending over several hundred years. Very few of the 
reported cases concern territory completely uninhabited at the time 
of discovery, and none involve an area completely incapable of habi-
tation at the time of the decision. 61 
It is submitted that such distinctions do not in fact exist and that 
the three cases examined below are particularly applicable to the 
Antarctic situation. First, a long history of exploration and assertion 
of sovereignty is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Judge Huber stated 
in the Island of Palmas Case: 
58. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 346; Hayton, supra note 39, at 601; Waldock, supra note 
40, at 326-27. 
59. Waldock, supra note 40, at 325. 
60. Hayton, supra note 39, at 603. 
61. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 123. While the decisions of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the International Court of Justice are not governed by the princi-
ple of stare decisis, nevertheless, the analysis and rationale of the early sovereignty cases are 
heavily relied upon in subsequent Court determinations. 
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it is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to 
a very far distant period. It may suffice that such display existed 
. . . long enough to enable any Power . . . to have . . . a reasonable 
possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary 
to her real or alleged rights. 62 
Second, the Clipperton Island Case concerned territory which was 
completely uninhabited. Finally, Antarctica is not now, nor would 
it be at the time of decision, completely incapable of habitation. 
Argentina has manned an observatory on Laurie Island, in the 
South Orkneys, since 1904 on a continuous, year-round basis. 63 
An examination of the decisions in the following cases provides 
a familiarity with the guidelines used in approaching the issue of 
territorial sovereignty over isolated, desolate areas. Such an exami-
nation cannot help but provide the necessary tools for an analysis 
of the legal status of territorial claims in the Antarctic. 
A. The Island of Palmas Case 
The Island of Palmas decision is founded upon the seminal 
concept of peaceful and continuous display of state authority. This 
concept receives primary emphasis and is regarded as sine qua non 
in the acquisition of territorial sovereignty. Of what exactly does the 
display of authority consist? Since the display of state authority and 
the right of sovereignty which it confers cannot under international 
law exist as an exercise of sovereignty in the abstract, such display 
must be accompanied by "concrete manifestations."64 These mani-
festations may take on different forms depending upon various con-
ditions of time and place, and Judge Huber specified that the habit-
ability of the region claimed is a significant factor in determining 
the extent of manifestation required. 65 There is, however, an addi-
tional requirement. Not only must the display of authority be evi-
denced by concrete manifestation, but it must also be continuous 
and "follow the conditions required by the evolution of law. " 66 In 
applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the case, Judge 
Huber determined that the United States, which had acquired title 
to Palmas Island through discovery, recognition by treaty, and con-
62. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 867, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 908. 
63. Hayton, supra note 39, at 587. 
64. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 876. 
65. Id. at 840, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 877. 
66. Id. at 845, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 883. 
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tiguity, nevertheless possessed an inferior claim to the island. The 
United States had "not established the fact that sovereignty so 
acquired was effectively displayed at any time. "67 In effect, despite 
the abstract title purportedly created in the United States by virtue 
of the theories advanced, the United States had never furnished the 
Netherlands or the court with concrete manifestations of the exer-
cise of sovereignty. Although Moore's settlement requirement68 has 
been vitiated and replaced by a more relaxed standard, some act or 
series of acts, continuous in nature, must be exhibited. 
Bernhardt states that Judge Huber was "the first to circum-
scribe" the growing body of exceptions to the effective occupation 
doctrine "by putting relative bounds on it."69 The minimum degree 
of effective control is the peaceful and continuous display of state 
authority, evidenced by concrete manifestations which may vary 
according to the circumstances of time and place. Ho~ does this 
principle affect the various claims to Antarctic territory? Have 
there been concrete manifestations of display of authority by the 
claimant states sufficient to meet the Palmas Island standard? 
Bernhardt maintains that there were not permanent settlements or 
continuous state activities on the Antarctic continent until the 
1950's.70 He therefore concludes that Antarctica "fails to fulfill the 
exceptions enunciated in the Palmas [Case]." 71 The claimant state 
must still establish that it can exercise control over the region 
claimed, and bare assertions of claims, without proof of the power 
to exercise control, will not suffice as proof of sovereignty. Hyde is 
in substantial agreement with this position since he contends that 
"relaxation should be confined to the waiving of settlement as a 
necessary condition for the perfecting of a right of sovereignty."72 
The positions of Bernhardt and Hyde, based upon a narrow 
construction of the principle enunciated in the Palmas Case, would 
seem to close the door to all states claiming sovereign rights in the 
Antarctic. Such contentions, however, are an oversimplification of 
that principle. The concept of continuous and peaceful display of 
state authority was sufficiently qualified to allow the possibility of 
valid claims to portions of Antarctic territory. 
67. Id. at 867, 22 AM. J . INT'L L. at 907 (emphasis added). 
68. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
69. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 329. 
70. Id. at 318. 
71 . Id. at 331. 
72 . Hyde, supra note 32, at 293-94. 
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While asserting that the court is inclined to give greater weight 
to acts of display of state authority, Judge Huber nevertheless 
stated that there may well be circumstances where such acts of 
display will not be required: 
The fact that a state cannot prove display of sovereignty as regards 
[partly uninhabited or unsubdued portions] of territory cannot 
forthwith be interpreted as showing that sovereignty is inexistent. 
Each case must be appreciated in accordance with the particular 
circumstances.73 
In discussing the need for concrete manifestation of display of au-
thority, Judge Huber left another slight crack in what Bernhardt 
and Hyde view as an impenetrable wall. The display of authority 
required, and the nature of such display, should be in precise rela-
tion to the territory in dispute. Bernhardt maintains that the mini-
mum requirement for such display is some form of effective admin-
istration, 74 but Judge Huber indicated that "[i]t is not necessary 
that there should be a special administration established in [the] 
territory."75 It therefore logically follows that, absent some particu-
lar requirement for "special administration" of given Antarctic ter-
ritory, Bernhardt's minimum requirement of effective administra-
tion could be waived without prejudice to a claimant state's sover-
eign rights. 
There are three other principles set out in the Palmas Island 
Case which are relevant to the discussion of Anglo-Argentine rights. 
The first principle concerns a question which arises again in the 
Eastern Greenland Case: if one state, at some time in the past, 
recognized or admitted to the sovereignty of another state over given 
territory, does such recognition or admission create a presumption 
of sovereignty in the second state? Judge Huber's response is cate-
gorical: "no presumptions of this kind are to be applied in interna-
tional arbitrations, except under express stipulation. It remains for 
the Tribunal to decide . . . . "76 
The second principle is perhaps more subtle, and it is easily 
glossed over in the context of its presentation. After examining the 
evidence marshalled by the Netherlands and the United States in 
73. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 855, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 894. 
74. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 332. 
75. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 857, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 896. 
76. Id. at 864, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 904-05. 
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support of their respective claims, Judge Huber concluded: 
"[ t]here is moreover no evidence which would establish any act of 
display of sovereignty over the island by Spain or another Power, 
such as might counter-balance or annihilate the manifestations of 
Netherlands sovereignty."77 Clearly, the notion of counter-balance 
could prove to be a critical one, particularly in its application to the 
situation in the Antarctic. After reviewing Judge Huber's exhaus-
tive analysis of the concept of peaceful and continuous display of 
authority, it is easy to conclude that in any given case there is but 
one state which could meet the criteria required for the exercise of 
sovereignty. But the notion of counter-balance dispels such a con-
clusion. 
Lastly, the theory of contiguity is examined in the Island of 
Palmas Case. Notwithstanding von der Heydte's assertion of the 
validity of the principle, 78 Judge Huber appears to have dismissed 
it entirely: 
[I]t is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive interna-
tional law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial wa-
ters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its territory 
forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable 
size). 79 
Bernhardt apparently accepts this generalization and concludes 
that the principle of contiguity "has now for all practical purposes 
fallen into desuetude and has no adherents in modern international 
law."80 This, too, may be an oversimplification, for Judge Huber, 
while refusing to place the imprimatur of international law on the 
contiguity theory, nevertheless conceded that the principle may well 
have its place outside the realm of the law: 
The principle of contiguity, in regard to islands, may not be out of 
place when it is a question of alloting them to one State rather than 
another, either by agreement between the Parties, or by a decision 
not necessarily based on law . . . . 81 
Once again, Judge Huber has refrained from turning the key in the 
lock. 
77. Id. at 868, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 909 (emphasis added). 
78. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
79. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 854, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 893 (emphasis added). 
80. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 342. 
81. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 854, 
22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 893 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Clipperton Island Case 
In order fully to appreciate the significance of the Clipperton 
Island Case, decided three years after the Palmas decision, a brief 
recitation of the facts is necessary. France discovered the island in 
1857. In 1858, a French commercial ship, L 'Amiral, returned to the 
island in order annex it to France. On board was a commissioner of 
the French government who drew up an act, in accordance with 
instructions from the Minister of Marine, in which sovereignty over 
the island was proclaimed for France. The ship itself was never able 
to reach the island, but some members of the crew went ashore by 
means of a small boat. The crew returned to the ship without having 
left "any sign of sovereignty" ashore, and L 'Amiral departed on 
November 20, 1858. From that date until the end of 1887, at which 
time France lodged a protest with the United States over the pres-
ence of American citizens collecting guano on the island, "no posi-
tive and apparent act of sovereignty can be recalled either on the 
part of France or on the part of any other Powers."82 In 1897, Mexico 
dispatched a gunboat to the island, despite the French claim of 
sovereignty, and proclaimed that Clipperton was territory 
"belonging to her for a long time." In opposition to the French 
position, Mexico, invoking the uti possidetis doctrine, claimed that 
the island had been first discovered by the Spanish and therefore 
belonged to Mexico as Spain's successor.83 The dispute was submit-
ted to Victor Emmanuel III, the King of Italy, for arbitration. 
The arbiter dismissed Mexico's invocation of uti possidetis on 
the grounds that Mexico had failed to demonstrate first, that Spain 
had had the right to incorporate the island and, second, that either 
Spain or Mexico "had effectively exercised the right."84 In the ab-
sence of such effective exercise, Clipperton Island, at the time of the 
French proclamation of November, 1858, "was in the legal situation 
of territorium nullius, and, therefore, susceptible of occupation. "85 
Victor Emmanuel then turned to the French claim and proceeded 
to apply, and expand, the principles enunciated in the Island of 
Palmas Case. 
The principle of peaceful and continuous display of authority 
receives a slightly different interpretation in the Clipperton Island 
82. Clipperton Island Case (Mexico v. France), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1108, 26 AM. 
J. INT'L L. at 391. 
83. Id. at 1109, 26 AM. J . INT'L L. at 392. 
84. Id. at 1110, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393. 
85. Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393. 
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Case. The two elements of intent and actual display are present, but 
the second element is phrased in a significant manner: 
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force 
of law, besides the animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nomi-
nal, taking of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. The 
taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which 
the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question 
and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. 86 
In applying this principle to the factual situation in the Clipperton 
Island Case, it is readily apparent that France indicated her intent 
to exercise sovereignty; the proclamation of November, 1858, satis-
fies the first requirement. But by what act, or series of acts, did 
France reduce the island to her possession? The French government 
performed only two acts during the time period examined: (1) the 
proclamation of annexation in 1858, and (2) the protest lodged with 
the United States in 1887. In light of Judge Huber's insistence, in 
the Island of Palmas Case, upon continuous display of authority 
through concrete manifestations, it would seem that the French 
claim must fail. The arbiter, however, noted that, while some form 
of active, continuous administration is ordinarily required to com-
ply with the second element, such activity is only a procedural step 
in the taking of possession. In fact, he stated that there may be no 
need for such activity at all: 
There may also be cases where it is unnecessary to have recourse to 
this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was 
completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupy-
ing state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undis-
puted disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of 
possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation 
is thereby completed. 87 
In effect, the continuous display of authority, so heavily under-
scored by Judge Huber, has been waived in a case concerning unin-
habited territory. The single act of proclamation by the French has 
been held sufficient to validate the claim of French sovereignty. 
In applying the Clipperton rationale to the Antarctic situation, 
Bernhardt concludes that the case must be distinguished. He as-
serts that the Clipperton formula is designed for an uninhabited but 
small island which is nevertheless susceptible of territorial occupa-
86. Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393. 
87 . Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394. 
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tion and administration. The Antarctic continent, he concludes, "is 
not amenable to so cavalier a treatment."88 But the grounds for such 
a distinction between Clipperton and the Antarctic are invalid, for 
it must be emphasized that, although Clipperton may very well 
have been susceptible to some form of occupation or administration, 
the arbiter nevertheless expressly dispensed with the necessity for 
such activity. In addition, the language of the decision was not 
directed merely at islands; rather, the subject matter was termed 
uninhabited "territory." The unmistakable result of the Clipperton 
Island Case is a further relaxation of the traditional standards for 
acquisition of territorial sovereignty. 
C. The Eastern Greenland Case 
The Eastern Greenland Case represents the final rung on the 
chronological ladder of standard-relaxation. The case indicates that 
the concept of peaceful and continuous display of state authority 
has clearly expanded beyond the guidelines so clearly outlined in 
the Island of Palmas Case. The change in approach is not a sudden 
one, however, and the Court noted, while describing the nature of 
the principle, that its lenient view had its foundation in the develop-
ment of prior case law: 
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as 
to territorial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the 
tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual 
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not 
make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of 
claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled 
countries.89 
Having prefaced its opinion with a view toward leniency, the 
Court nevertheless asserted that some actual display of authority is 
necessary. The Court has not totally abandoned the two-element 
requirement for valid claims to sovereignty. As in the Clipperton 
case, the intent to exercise sovereign rights is not seriously ques-
tioned or analyzed, but what activities qualify to fulfill the require-
ment of actual display of authority? The Court provided two exam-
ples. The first is legislation concerning the disputed area by the 
state seeking to prove its claim. Legislation is regarded as "one of 
the most obvious forms of the exercise of sovereign power . " 90 
88. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 330-31. 
89. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 46. 
90. Id. at 48. 
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Almost as an afterthought, the Court asserted that even if such 
legislation were directed toward a particular area of colonization in 
a given territory, such fact is not grounds for holding that the legis-
lation is "restricted to the colonized area. " 91 In effect, then, legisla-
tion directed at a relatively small area of territory may be sufficient 
to fulfill the actual display requirement for the entire territory. In 
addition to legislation, "concessions granted for the erection of tele-
graph lines" are deemed manifestations of the exercise of sover-
eignty, 92 and the Court concluded that these and other similar acts, 
combined with a variety of scientific activities, are sufficient to 
show that the claimant state has met the two-element requirement 
and has established a valid claim of sovereignty. 93 
In his dissent, Judge Vogt maintained that Denmark did dis-
play the requisite animus possidendi but asked rhetorically whether 
Denmark did in fact have the corpus possessionis. 94 One authority 
has concluded, with Judge Vogt, that the answer to the question is 
a categorical no. He maintains that Denmark prevailed despite "the 
obvious weaknesses" in her position. 95 What, then, is the status of 
the peaceful and continuous display requirement in light of the 
Court's arguably lenient decision? Bernhardt maintains that the 
requirement for actual display is still very much in evidence but 
adds that the extent of such display "is a relative and not an abso-
lute concept; that is, the requisite degree depends on the activities 
of other states in the disputed area. "96 It is questionable whether the 
notion of relative display is of any assistance in clarifying the re-
spective positions of rival claimant states. Relative display is simply 
an alternate way of expressing the problem, not of positing a worka-
ble solution. A more realistic appraisal of the decision is provided 
by Svarlien. He maintains that the Court, while affirming the gen-
eral concept of peaceful and continuous display, "merely changed 
its content, " 97 and the net effect of such change was to reduce the 
resulting content "to an ill-defined minimum."98 Another commen-
tator concludes that the Court's decision demonstrates an abandon-
ment of the two-element requirement altogether. 
91. Id. at 49. 
92. Id. at 53. 
93. Id. at 62-63. 
94. Id. at 102. 
95. 0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 68. 
96. Bernhardt, supra note 9, at 326. 
97. 0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 63. 
98. Id. at 68. 
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By [the time of the Eastern Greenland Case], it had become a 
matter of expediency; faced with the problem of awarding territory 
to one or another State, the court merely gave it to the one with the 
better claim, regardless of how weak that claim was in itself.99 
In accordance with Svarlien's analysis of the Eastern Greenland 
decision, the consolidation of "territorial titles can best be under-
stood in terms of the evolution and growth of public international 
law. "100 
IV. GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA BEFORE THE 
COURT 
The Anglo-Argentine dispute over Antarctic territory has been 
a bitter one, marked by several incidents of a serious nature. The 
expedition of the Argentine ship Primera de Mayo in 1942 pro-
claimed the annexation of an Argentine Antarctic sector and in-
stalled commemorative bronze plaques on Deception and Wieneke 
Islands. The following year, the British Ambassador personally re-
turned one of the plaques to the Argentine government. 101 Crewmen 
of the H. M. S. Carnavon Castle removed the national colors of Ar-
gentina from the walls of a whaling factory located on Deception 
Island; the colors had apparently been painted there by members 
of the Primera de Mayo expedition. 102 Argentina has refused to pro-
cess mail bearing British stamps produced in the Falkland Is-
lands.103 In 1952, the Argentine navy, resorting to the use of gunfire, 
compelled a British scientific expedition to withdraw from the Hope 
Bay area, and, in 1953, a British official assisted by a small military 
squad dismantled huts on Deception Island which had previously 
been constructed by Argentine and Chilean nationals. Two Ar-
gentines were arrested. 104 In light of the foregoing incidents, the 
frequently cited decision of a student moot court, 105 which held that 
allowing polar areas to continue as terra nullius would not generate 
international tensions which could lead to war, is decidely inappro-
priate. With the possible termination of the Antarctic Treaty, a 
resolution of the Anglo-Argentine dispute by the International 
99. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 114. 
100. 0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 58. 
101. Hayton, supra note 39, at 589. 
102. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 28. 
103. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 149. 
104. Id. 
105. Elder, supra note 45, at 658. 
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Court of Justice is a distinct possibility and, in Shakespeare's 
phrase, "a consummation devoutly to be wish'd." 106 
A. The Case for Great Britain 
Great Britain relies, for the most part, upon the sector theory 
as the nucleus of her Antarctic claims. Some authorities have ac-
cepted the sector theory, if not as proof of territorial sovereignty, at 
least "as a method of asserting territorial claims."107 The British 
adopted the theory in 1917 and proclaimed the boundaries of their 
Antarctic sector to be the lines 20° and 80° west longitude; the ter-
ritories within those boundaries are known as the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies. 108 Great Britain's claims to the Antarctic mainland 
are based upon the delimitation of this sector, but a distinction is 
made between the theories which support the sector claim. The 
land bases which form the outer boundaries of the British sector are 
said not to be the Falkland Islands; rather, the boundaries are 
formed by points on the Antarctic mainland which mark the outer 
edge of discoveries and exploration of the continental land mass 
itself. 109 It is argued, therefore, that the British sector has its founda-
tion in the continuity-hinterland theory and not in the contiguity 
theory espoused by Argentina. The result is that Great Britain has 
arguably paid tribute to the accepted modes of territorial acquisi-
tion, viz., discovery and occupation, whereas Argentina, by endors-
ing the contiguity theory as a basis for its sector claim, has ignored 
those accepted modes. 110 Regardless of this fine distinction made 
between supporting theories, there is authority for holding that 
Great Britain "has a very substantial case for many individual terri-
tories within [her] sector. " 111 
In line with her recognition of the traditional modes of terri-
torial acquisition, Britain has taken great pains to demonstrate the 
validity of her claims by detailing the discovery and effective occu-
pation of various territories withfo her sector. The discovery of Gra-
ham Land in 1820 is attributed to E. Bransfield, a British naval 
officer, and it is contended that the first discoveries of South Geor-
gia, the South Shetland Islands, the South Orkney Islands, and the 
106. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act III, Scene I. 
107. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 285 (3d ed. 1976). 
108. Reeves, supra note 45, at 519. 
109. Waldock, supra note 40, at 340. 
110. Id. at 341. 
111 . Hayton, supra note 39, at 584. 
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South Sandwich Islands were made by British citizens. 112 In addi-
tion, "acts of annexation" were performed in the name of the British 
Crown. In juxtaposition to these activities, it is asserted that neither 
Spain nor Argentina, as Spain's successor, made any discoveries 
whatsoever in the disputed area. 113 These British acts of acquisition 
were confirmed by the issuance of Letters Patent in July of 1908114 
and in March of 1917115 wherein the territorial boundaries of the 
sector were proclaimed. 
In addition to these arguments in support of her establishment 
of primary title, a catalogue of activities is set out as proof of Great 
Britain's numerous manifestations of sovereignty. Whaling and 
sealing laws are submitted as examples of direct British control over 
the area. 116 In fact, such laws are used as a springboard to introduce 
what may be a very novel concept: the "reasonable sovereign" stan-
dard. Great emphasis is placed upon the fact that Argentina took 
no steps to regulate whaling and sealing activities in the region and 
therefore did not act "as a prudent sovereign would have done, or 
sought to do .... " 117 As further examples of British manifestations 
of sovereignty, reference is made to the establishment of the 
Discovery Committee, 118 the activities of the British Graham Land 
Expedition, 119 the organization of the Falkland Islands Dependen-
cies Survey, 120 and, finally, to a list of active British bases main-
tained in various parts of the disputed territory .121 Thus, it is argued, 
the numerous activities of Great Britain within the area of the Falk-
land Islands Dependencies proves beyond doubt that it "displayed 
and exercised its sovereignty" 122 in accordance with the principle of 
peaceful and continuous display of state authority as enunciated in 
the Palmas Island, Clipperton Island, and Eastern Greenland 
Cases. 123 
Permanent settlement has not been advanced or mentioned as 
112. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 12. 
113. Id. at 12-13. 
114. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, Declarations Concerning Antarctic Territories, in [1948-
49] INT'L LEGAL Docs. 217, 231-32 (1950). 
115. Id. at 233. 
116. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 17. 
117. Id. at 27. 
118. Id. at 20. 
119. Id. at 21. 
120. Id. at 29. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 32. 
123. Id. at 33-34. 
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a rationale for the British claim. The various manifestations of Bri-
tish activity in the disputed sector are all of a temporary nature: 
summer visits, expeditions, intermittently manned outposts. Wal-
dock, a proponent of the British claims in the Antarctic, discounts 
this absence of permanent activity or occupation by emphasizing 
the relaxation of standards outlined in the three sovereignty cases: 
It is enough if the state displays the functions of a state in a manner 
corresponding to the circumstances of the territory, assumes the 
responsibility to exercise local administration, and does so in fact 
as and when occasion demands. 124 
Great Britain will very likely strengthen her position by vigor-
ous attack upon the Argentine claims. Assuming the existence of a 
previous, clear Spanish title to the disputed territory, there are six 
possible resulting situations, 125 in regard to territorial sovereignty, 
under presently accepted precepts of international law. Regardless 
of the possibility chosen, Argentina is faced with a serious problem: 
presuming an inchoate title is possessed by Argentina, no matter 
how obtained, there is a noticeable absence of evidence to indicate 
that she has perfected or maintained such title over the disputed 
territory.126 In addition, as Great Britain has previously emphasized, 
Argentina knew of the British claims in 1909 but offered no opposi-
tion or protest to such claims when the British Letters Patent of 
1908 were brought to the attention of the Argentine Foreign Minis-
ter. In fact, the British Minister concluded from the Argentine offi-
cial's reaction that Argentina did "not dispute the rights of Great 
Britain . . .. " 127 On the basis of these weaknesses in the Argentine 
position and in view of the extensive activities of the British govern-
ment within her sector, Waldock asserts that "there is plainly a 
124. Waldock, supra note 40, at 336. 
125. Hayton considers five situations where some stage of Antarctic sovereignty is 
reached by a claimant state. The sixth situation is Antarctica as terra nullius: 
(1) Spanish inchoate title persisting; 
(2) Spanish title perfected, sovereignty maintained; 
(3) Argentine or Chilean inchoate title by proven succession, or rediscovery and 
annexation of lapsed Spanish titles; 
(4) Argentine or Chilean sovereignty, as successor to perfected title or by mainte-
nance of title perfected after 1810; 
(5) Terra nullius; 
(6) Inchoate title or sovereignty of a third state established. 
Hayton, supra note 39, at 602. 
126. Id. at 602-03. 
127. Memorial of the United Kindgom, supra note 1, at 22-23. For the counter-argument, 
see note 76 supra and accompanying text. 
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substantial prima-facie case both in fact and in law for the United 
Kingdom's" claim to sovereign rights in the Antarctic. 128 
A further, extra-legal, consideration is the 1955 British applica-
tion for judicial determination of the issue by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. It can be viewed as a positive advantage in 
two respects. First, the application was a demonstrable consolida-
tion of British rights: 
While the practical wisdom of this type of[ application] proceeding 
may sometimes be open to question, there can be no doubt that to 
propose arbitration or judicial settlement in appropriate circum-
stances is a necessary precautionary measure for a State wishing to 
safeguard its rights. 129 
Second, by placing its application before the Court, Britain has 
made her claim, and the legitimate arguments supporting that 
claim, a matter of public record. By so doing, Britain may be said 
to have captured the advantage in the arena of world diplomacy.130 
B. The Case for Argentina 
Argentina originally expressed official opposition to the sector 
theory, presumably due to the fact that the British had seen fit to 
adopt it.131 Eventually, however, Argentina did embrace the theory 
and proclaimed her sector to extend from 25° to 74° west longitude, 
an area located entirely within the boundaries established by Great 
Britain.132 While Britain bases its adherence to the sector theory 
upon the principle of continuity-hinterland, Argentina supports her 
adoption of the theory with the principle of contiguity. Although the 
Antarctic continent is approximately 700 miles from the Argentine 
coast, it is contended nevertheless that the Palmer Peninsula (la-
belled Graham Land on British maps) is an extension of the South 
American continent and that the two land masses are connected by 
a continental shelf.133 It has been noted, despite Waldock's valiant 
attempt to demonstrate otherwise, that Great Britain's sector is 
based upon the outward projection of longitudinal lines from the 
Falkland Islands and not from points of discovery along the Antarc-
128. Waldock, supra note 40, at 353. 
129. S. ROSENNE, THE TIME FACTOR IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 30 n.5 (1960) . 
130. See S. RosENNE, THE WORLD CouRT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 161 (1962). 
131. Hayton, supra note 39, at 588. 
132. Id. at 590. 
133. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 143. 
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tic mainland. 134 It appears somewhat paradoxical that Great Britain 
can assert, on the one hand, that the Falkland Islands form some 
unique relationship with the Antarctic continental land mass and, 
on the other hand, that the Argentine claim of a contiguous relation-
ship with the same land mass is somehow illegal and invalid. The 
British position is even more questionable in view of the fact that 
the Argentine mainland is significantly closer to the continental 
land mass than are the Falkland Islands. 135 It should be remembered 
that the sector theory has its origin in the Arctic model, first pro-
posed by Canada. 136 One of the requirements for use of the Arctic 
model was that the claimant state's territory extend within the 
Arctic Circle. While no claimant state can meet that requirement 
in the case of the Antarctic model, it is nevertheless significant that 
the South American continent projects farther south than any other. 
In view of this fact, and in view of Argentina's alleged contiguity 
with the Antarctic mainland, Argentina's "failure technically to 
penetrate the Antarctic Circle may not be crucial."137 Finally, in 
contrast with the British reliance upon the Falkland Island connec-
tion, the Argentine sector model is strategically superior: Argen-
tina's direct proximity with the disputed territory renders its sector 
more easily defensible,138 and this fact goes straight to the issue of 
exertion of state authority or control. 
Argentina maintains a "low profile" with respect to the tradi-
tional mode of discovery as a tool for territorial acquisition. The 
doctrine of uti possidetis is substituted for discovery, and, despite 
the fact that the existence of the Antarctic continent was unknown 
during the time of the early Spanish explorations, Argentina posits 
the validity of Spanish claims, placing heavy emphasis on the fact 
that these claims "went undisputed for several hundred years 
•••• "
139 Despite the fact that a majority of authority finds rela-
tively little merit in the invocation of uti possidetis, one authority 
has concluded that the holding in the Eastern Greenland Case lends 
credence to the doctrine. The fact that the Court placed significant 
emphasis upon the ancient claims of Denmark, while it proportion-
ately relaxed the requirement of occupation, it is argued, demon-
134. Jessup, supra note 11, at 119. 
135. Hayton, supra note 39, at 604 n.91. 
136. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
137. Hayton, supra note 39, at 603. 
138. Claims, supra note 16, at 396. 
139. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 146. 
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strates the Court's acceptance of a principle similar to the uti 
possidetis doctrine. 140 While such an argument could be advanced 
by Argentina, it is admittedly not a strong one.141 In lieu of submit-
ting discovery arguments of her own, Argentina might well attack 
the basis of British discovery claims on the grounds that discovery, 
without more, is insufficient to validate a claim of sovereignty. Ref-
erence, by analogy, to British claims in Eastern Antarctica may 
prove fruitful: 
Britain ... laid claim to a great expanse of Antarctic territory in 
1933, when it was stated at an Imperial Conference that the raising 
of the British flag at various points . . . gave that State sovereignty 
over "all islands and territories" within [specified] limits. 142 
Claims made in such a fashion were rejected out of hand by Judge 
Huber in the Island of Palmas Case. 143 
Argentina has also proclaimed and confirmed the establish-
ment of primary title to Antarctic territory by means of official 
statements. In 1927, a Note addressed to the Director of the Univer-
sal Postal Union declared that "Argentine territorial jurisdiction 
extends de jure and de facto to the continental area . . . and to 
polar territories which have not been delimited." 144 In a Note to the 
Chilean Ambassador, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations 
made reference to the existence of Argentina's permanent observa-
tory on Laurie Island and stated that Argentina is the only country 
" 'which maintains in real form the rule of its sovereignty in the 
lands of the Antarctic.' " 145 The content of these statements was 
repeated in subsequent official communications including a Note to 
the British Foreign Minister in 1953146 and a Decree-Law published 
in 1957.147 
"Argentina fully realizes that administrative organization of 
territory is considered a major act of sovereignty in the perfection 
and maintenance of titles. " 148 In accordance with that realization, 
140. Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignties in the Antarctic, [1949] Y.B. OF WORLD AFF. 252, 
267-68. 
141. Claims, supra note 16, at 395. 
142. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 119. 
143. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
144. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, supra note 114, at 218. 
145. Id. at 221. 
146. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 146 & n.41. 
147. Hanessian, Antarctica: Current National Interests and Legal Realities, [1958] AM. 
Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 145, 152 n.17 . 
148. Hayton, supra note 39, at 590. 
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Argentina, too, has marshalled evidence of her manifestations of 
state authority within the disputed area. A substantial number of 
bases has been established in the South Shetlands, Graham Land, 
and Coats Land. 149 Argentina has issued special postage stamps 
which indicate her Antarctic claims. Of considerable significance, 
however, is the establishment of permanent outposts in the Antarc-
tic region: "[m]ore important, actual postoffices serving the year-
round bases have been in operation since 1947. Argentina's Laurie 
Island (South Orkneys) postoffice dates technically from 1904."150 In 
light of Great Britain's failure to establish permanent bases prior to 
those of Argentina, the latter nation's most significant argument in 
regard to the principle of effective occupation is her maintenance of 
a permanent observatory within her designated sector. "Foremost 
among Argentine claims . . . is the fact of a meteorological observa-
tory in continuous operation since February 22, 1904, on Laurie 
Island in the South Orkneys, just inside accepted 'Antarctic lati-
tudes.' " 151 The permanent, continuous nature of this outpost has 
given Argentina, if not an advantage over, at least occupation argu-
ments as persuasive as those of Great Britain. And the significance 
of this fact has not been lost on her competitors. "[A]ll major 
claimants are now following the Chilean and Argentine lead in the 
establishment of permanent (year-round) military, weather service 
and scientific encampments in order to be able to show 'continuous 
settlement.' " 152 
Argentina is certainly not without recourse to the Palmas Is-
land, Clipperton Island, and Eastern Greenland Cases. The end 
result of the chronological development of those cases was that little 
more than a demonstrable intent to exercise sovereign rights is re-
quired to sustain a state's claim, provided no rival state can demon-
strate a superior claim.153 Given the more logical approach of the 
Argentine sector theory, in addition to Argentine manifestations of 
state authority, Argentina possesses an equal if not superior claim 
to that of Great Britain and therefore has met the judicial prerequi-
sites for a valid claim to sovereignty. Argentina has not limited 
herself to advancing a single theory; rather, she has "alleged a valid 
claim on any and all theories which might be available." 154 
149. Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 1, at 31. 
150. Hayton, supra note 39, at 588 n.26. 
151. Id. at 587 (emphasis added); see Claims, supra note 16, at 396. 
152. Hayton, supra note 39, at 599-600. 
153. 0. SvARLIEN, supra note 20, at 69. 
154. Validity of Claims, supra note 18, at 119-20. 
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Argentina might well use an additional argument against the 
validity of the British claim: the anti-colonial pronouncements of 
the Monroe Doctrine as embodied in the Argentine reservation to 
the Rio Treaty.155 At the time of the British application to the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, Argentina cited the provi-
sions of the treaty as grounds for not submitting to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. She claimed that the dismantling of Argentine huts 
on Deception Island and the arrest of two Argentine nationals there 
"were acts of an 'extracontinental Power' against Argentine 'terri-
torial Patrimony.' " 156 In regard to the Monroe Doctrine itself, the 
Latin American nations have asserted that it has particular appli-
cation to the Western Antarctic, 157 and despite the fact that the 
United States has refused to recognize any claim of territorial 
sovereignty in the Antarctic, the American position is clearly in 
support of Argentina in its dispute with Britain: 
In [1939] Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that 
"considerations of continental defense make it vitally important to 
keep for the twenty-one American Republics a clearer title to that 
part of the Antarctic continent south of America than is claimed by 
any non-American country," a statement currently invoked by 
Chile and Argentina in their disputes with Britain. 158 
As one authority has stated, the hemispheric nature represented by 
such treaties and pronouncements forms a "cornerstone" of the Ar-
gentine claim to Antarctic territory .159 
V. CONCLUSION 
A critical weakness in the British position and one which is 
especially vulnerable to Argentine attack is the designation by 
Great Britain of the Falkland Islands as the hub of Antarctic activ-
ity and the linchpin of the British sector claim. The Falkland Is-
lands, by virtue of the Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917, were made 
the source of administrative authority in the British Antarctic; in-
deed, Great Britain has underscored this fact by terming the various 
155. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, done September 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 
1681 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (effective Dec. 3, 1948). For full text of the 
Argentine reservation, see Final Act of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance 
of Continental Peace and Security, Sept. 2, 1947, 21 U.N.T.S. 116, 173, 175. 
156. Hayton, supra note 39, at 593. 
157. Claims, supra note 16, at 396. 
158. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 155 (emphasis added). 
159. Hayton, supra note 39, at 593. 
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British Antarctic claims as "the Falkland Islands Dependencies."160 
By so doing, Great Britain has disadvantaged herself in two critical 
respects. First, she treats such territories as South Georgia and the 
South Sandwich Islands, both north of the 60th parallel, as "at most 
sub-Antarctic, " 161 but her acts in reference to all her Antarctic 
claims take place, to a significant extent, in the immediate area of 
these islands. Such a position has been recognized as a serious weak-
ness in Britain's application to the Court in 1955. 162 Second, Argen-
tina does not recognize the British claim to the Falkland Islands 
themselves. As long ago as 1927, Argentina declared its opposition 
to British occupation of the islands: "[ d]e jure, the Archipelago of 
the Malvinas [Falklands] also belongs to this jurisdiction, but it 
cannot be exercised de facto because of the occupation maintained 
by Great Britain."163 And in 1957, Argentina extended her adminis-
tration over the Falklands, going so far as to designate Ushuaia as 
the capital city .164 Regardless of the outcome of the dispute over the 
Falklands themselves, Great Britain's chain of sovereignty has argu-
ably been stretched to its tenuous limit. 
Finally, it must be stated that in reference to extra-legal argu-
ments in support of her position, Argentina's case is far from infe-
rior. The fact that the British were the first to have applied to the 
Court for settlement of the sovereignty issue is a sword which cuts 
both ways. "As Judge Lauterpacht says, applications of this nature 
may be mere political devices intended to embarass the state whom 
it is sought to make defendant." 165 Should the British move be so 
viewed, it may well work to the advantage of Argentina rather than 
Great Britain. This potential advantage, however, is a minor one 
when compared to the other extra-legal considerations which could 
well tip the balance in Argentina's favor. 
World opinion is an extraordinarily potent force and one the 
effect of which will not be lost upon the International Court. Great 
Britain is faced with its image as a colonial power, and colonialism 
is seriously frowned upon by the world community. Argentina, on 
the other hand, has nationalism, with its concomitant values of 
self-determination and burgeoning industrialization, on its side. As 
160. Id. at 588. 
161. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 313 n.1. 
162. Hayton, supra note 39, at 597 n.67. 
163. U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, supra note 114, at 218. 
164. Hanessian, supra note 147, at 152. 
165. R. ANAND, COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 125 
(1961). 
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one of the world's developing nations, it cannot help but elicit sym-
pathy and support from major powers and underdeveloped coun-
tries alike. 166 It has even been suggested, in view of the formidable 
potency of world opinion, that Great Britain assign her Antarctic 
claims in return for other considerations. 167 While Great Britain's 
position is far from being classified as insignificant, nevertheless 
"some battles, such as this one over Antarctic sovereignty, are not 
worth fighting." 168 
Russell W. MacKechnie, Jr. 
166. Hayton, supra note 39, at 608. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 609. 
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